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Subrogation In Medical Service Plans And
Medical Insurance Policies
Hospital Service Corporation v. Pennsylvania Insurance Company'
The Hospital Service Corporation (Blue Cross) issued to its sub-
scriber a hospital care plan which contained a subrogation clause. The
clause provided that if the subscriber were injured by the tortious act
of a third party and payments were made pursuant to the terms of the
plan, Blue Cross would be subrogated to the subscriber's right of
recovery against the tort-feasor and the subscriber would be required
to pay over to Blue Cross all amounts recovered in a suit against the
tort-feasor. The subscriber was injured by a negligent third party
and incurred a hospital bill, part of which Blue Cross paid in accord-
ance with its contract. Having received notification from Blue Cross
of its subrogation rights under the contract, the tort-feasor and the
tort-feasor's insurer nevertheless settled with the subscriber and ob-
tained from him a release of all claims. The tort-feasor's payment to
the subscriber under the terms of the settlement was in excess of the
entire hospital bill. Upon refusal of its demand for reimbursement,
Blue Cross brought suit against its subscriber, the tort-feasor, and
the tort-feasor's insurer, as co-defendants. The Supreme Court of
Rhode Island, considering the three questions certified to it by the trial
court, concluded that: (1) by contract Blue Cross was subrogated to
its subscriber's right of recovery against the tort-feasor; (2) the
release procured by the tort-feasor, who was aware of Blue Cross'
subrogation claim, was not a defense in Blue Cross' action to enforce
its subrogation claim against the tort-feasor; and (3) Blue Cross under
its contract could recover from its subscriber the amount it had paid
for hospital expenses.' In remanding the case to the trial court, the court
indicated that Blue Cross might recover either against its subscriber or
against the tort-feasor and the tort-feasor's insurer, but not against both.
Subrogation is an equitable doctrine akin to the concept of surety-
ship.' It is ". . . founded on the plainest principles of natural reason
and justice, that the surety paying off a debt shall stand in the place
of the creditor, and have all the rights which he has, for the purpose
of obtaining his reimbursement." 4 The Latin derivation of the word
"subrogation" provides perhaps the best short definition: sub -
"under" and rogare - "to ask."5 The theoretical purposes of subro-
1. 227 A.2d 105 (R.I. 1967).
2. Such recovery, however, might not equal the full amount of the sum paid to
the hospital because subscriber's "necessary and reasonable expenses" in seeking
recovery from tort-feasor might be deducted. Id. at 111.
3. The suretyship concept, involving a situation in which one person promises
to pay the obligation of another if that other does not pay, was highly developed in
Roman law. During the Middle Ages, however, the surety was little more than a
physical hostage, often loaded with chains to prevent flight. Modern suretyship is
not quite so harsh. See Loyd, The Surety, 66 U. PA. L. Rev. 40 (1917). See also
Ager, The Doctrine of Subrogation Pro Tanto, 29 INs. COUNSEL J. 426 (1962);
McPharlin, Subrogation Rights of the Contract Bond Surety, 33 INs. COUNSEL J. 93
(1966) ; Powers, The Problem of Balancing Equities in Subrogation Cases, 23 INS.
COUNSEL J. 104 (1956).
4. Hodgson v. Shaw, 3 Myl. & K. 183, 190-91, 40 Eng. Rep. 70, 73 (Ch. 1834).
See also Poe v. Philadelphia Cas. Co., 118 Md. 347, 84 A. 476 (1912).
5. Mullen, The Equitable Doctrine of Subrogation, 3 MD. L. REv. 201. (1939).
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gation are the prevention of unjust enrichment and the attainment
of substantial justice.' Consistent with these purposes the courts have
held that if the insured acts in such a manner as to defeat his insurer's
subrogation rights, he will not be permitted to recover on the policy.'
Subrogation may be either "legal" or "conventional". Legal
subrogation arises by operation of law even when there is no express
contractual provision. Even if a liability or fire insurance policy, for
example, does not contain a subrogation clause, the insurer is subro-
gated to the rights of the insured against a third-party tort-feasor upon
payment by the insurer to the insured.' On the other hand, conven-
tional subrogation arises by agreement between the parties. Although
property insurers sometimes contract for subrogation even though they
would be entitled to legal subrogation,9 conventional subrogation is im-
portant primarily in situations where legal subrogation is not available.
Traditionally, subrogation has been available only to insurers of
property; neither legal nor conventional subrogation has been extended
to insurers of the person. Consequently, subrogation is not permitted
in cases involving life insurance or insurance which pays a fixed rate
for personal injury. Medical insurance payments, which are intended
to compensate or indemnify the insured to the extent of the actual
injury inflicted, fall somewhere between the traditional concepts of
property and personal insurance. Such payments are similar to prop-
erty insurance proceeds in that they compensate only for actual loss
which can be objectively determined. At the same time they resemble
personal insurance benefits in that the payments are made because
of personal injury. Because medical payments lie in this gray area of
insurance, courts reach conflicting results in cases involving subroga-
tion under medical insurance policies.
The decisions of some courts with respect to subrogation in
medical service plans, such as Blue Cross and Blue Shield, are in-
fluenced by the argument that such plans are not insurance.'0 The
6. Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Moore, 134 A.2d 333, 335 (D.C. Mun. App.
1957) ; Cf. RESTATMENT OF RZSTITUTION § 76 (1937) : "A person who, in whole or in
part, has discharged a duty which is owed by him but which as between himself and
another should have been discharged by the other, is entitled to indemnity from
the other .... "
7. See, e.g., Miller v. St. Paul Ins. Co., 203 A.2d 923 (D.C. Mun. App. 1964).
In Miller, the insured took out an insurance policy on his baggage for an airplane trip.
After the airline had replaced some damaged baggage, he tried to collect on the insur-
ance policy. The court held that even without a subrogation clause the insurance
company had a right of subrogation which, when defeated by the insured, became a
"complete defense" to liability on the policy. See also Carstairs v. Mechanics' &
Traders' Ins. Co., 18 F. 473 (C.C.D. Md. 1883) (recovery on the policy was denied
after the defeat of an express subrogation clause by plaintiff-insured) ; Ocean Accident
& Guar. Corp. v. Hooker Electro-chemical Co., 240 N.Y. 37, 147 N.E. 351, 354 (1925).
8. Holland v. Morely Button Co., 83 N.H. 482, 145 A. 142, 144 (1929). See also
Georgia Ins. & Trust Co. v. Dawson, 2 Gill 365, 372-73 (Md. 1844).
9. Kimball & Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60 MIcH. L. Rsv.
841 (1962). See also Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Klomparens, 273 Mich. 493, 263 N.W.
724 (1935).
10. Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939) ; Group Health
Ass'n v. Moor, 24 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1938) (medical service plan providing service
and supplies held not to be insurance); Michigan Hosp. Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich.
357, 63 N.W.2d 638 (1954); Commissioner of Banking & Ins. v. Community Health
Serv., Inc., 129 N.J.L. 427, 30 A.2d 44 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943); Annot., 167 A.L.R.
322 (1947) ; Annot., 119 A.L.R. 1241 (1939) ; Annot., 100 A.L.R. 1449 (1936) ; Annot.,
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theoretical basis for this conclusion was explained in State ex rel.
Fishback v. Universal Service Agency," in which a service agency
which provided free medical service to its subscribers was held not
to be an insurance company for the purposes of the state insurance
code. The court suggested that in the absence of a "hazard or peril"
the plan did not fall within the definition of insurance contained in
the code.'" Thus, a practical consideration supports a distinction
between medical service plans and medical insurance: if medical service
plans were considered to be insurance, they would be subject to the
stringent requirements which are often statutorily prescribed for in-
surance companies. 3 Maryland, for example, distinguishes non-profit
health service plans from insurance by statute.14 However, the ques-
tion has never been judicially resolved in Maryland, and, in one of the
few Maryland cases involving Blue Cross, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland referred to it both as "hospitalization insurance" and as a
"non-profit health service plan."' 5 For purposes of subrogation, any
distinction between medical insurance and medical service plans is with-
out conceptual justification, since the policies for and against subroga-
tion apply equally to both.
The few cases dealing with subrogation rights under medical
service plans are in agreement. Absent an express subrogation clause
creating conventional subrogation, subrogation has not been allowed. 6
On the other hand, when a subrogation clause is included in the policy,
it has been given effect against the subscriber.'" The courts have also
upheld similar clauses of medical service plans which exclude coverage
when the subscriber is tortiously injured, unless the subscriber at-
63 A.L.R. 711 (1929). But cf. Cleveland Hosp. Serv. Ass'n v. Ebright, 36 Ohio L.
Abs. 600, 45 N.E.2d 157 (Ct. App. 1942), af'd, 142 Ohio St. 51, 49 N.E.2d 929
(1943). In the popular mind Blue Cross is insurance. See Drake, New Strides Made
in Health Insurance, Philadelphia Inquirer, March 3, 1968, § 7, at 8, col. 1 : ". . insur-
ance programs such as Blue Cross and Blue Shield . . ." But see Hospital Serv.
Corp. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105, 111 (R.I. 1967) : "It is generally agreed
that a corporation .. .which provides hospital care for its subscribers is not part
of the insurance industry."
11. 87 Wash. 413, 151 P. 768 (1915).
12. 151 P. at 772. See also California Physicians' Serv. v. Garrison, 28 Cal. 2d 790,
172 P.2d 4 (1946); 53 MIcH. L. Rsv. 484 (1955); 39 MINN. L. RZv. 218 (1955).
13. These requirements, involving such things as minimum capitalization, are in-
tended to apply to profit making concerns which Blue Cross and Blue Shield are not.
See authorities cited notes 9 & 10 supra.
14. MD. ANN. CoDE art. 48A, § 354 (1968). However, a recent amendment to the
Maryland Insurance Code has extended the definition of "insurer" to include a non-
profit health service plan for purposes of Subtitle 20 of the Insurance Code, which in-
volves the rehabilitation and liquidation of insurers. Ch. 288, [1968] Md. Laws 340.
15. Baltimore County Hosp., Inc. v. Maryland Hosp. Serv., Inc., 234 Md. 427,
429, 200 A.2d 39, 40, 41 (1964). See also Associated Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. Milwaukee
Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 170, 147 N.W.2d 225, 226 (1967) (Blue Cross referred
to as a "health insurance company'). The distinction is admittedly a highly technical
one but it can be important.
16. Michigan Hosp. Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 357, 63 N.W.2d 638 (1954).
There is no other authority for this proposition because, following this decision, subro-
gation clauses began to be routinely inserted in medical service plans. The dissent
in Sharpe suggests that defendant insured was primarily liable for the hospital bill,
that unjust enrichment to the defendant should be avoided, and that there is no justifi-
cation for preferring one class of indemnitors over another.
17. Hospital Serv. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105 (R.I. 1967);
Michigan Hosp. Serv. v. Sharpe, 339 Mich. 574, 64 N.W.2d 713 (1954).
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tempts to recover from the tort-feasor and fails.'" Conventional sub-
rogation is given effect in medical service plans for a variety of reasons.
The courts feel that subscribers should not receive windfalls'" and
that duplicating coverage can justifiably be avoided.2" Further, if sub-
rogation is permitted, the cost of such plans to the general public may
be reduced.2' Because, by strict definition, these plans are not insur-
ance, the long line of authority denying subrogation in personal injury
cases is not so persuasive. Finally, the courts are probably much more
inclined to grant subrogation to a non-profit medical service concern
than to a profit-making insurance company.
In the more frequently litigated area of medical insurance, how-
ever, courts hold widely diverging views founded on various notions
of public policy. A frequently used basis for denying subrogation
is the concept that subrogation is available only where the insurance
involves indemnity, i.e., making the insured whole.23 This concept is
the basis of the traditional distinction, in subrogation cases, between
property and personal insurance.2 4  The object of property insurance
is the indemnification of the insured for a specific loss. Subrogation is
allowed in this situation because of the obvious undesirability of
double recovery. In personal insurance, however, the exact loss is not
capable of ascertainment, and, thus, the reasons militating against
double recovery are less clear. As a result, subrogation is not allowed
under personal insurance contracts. 25 Some courts, mechanically apply-
ing the traditional distinction, have rejected even conventional subro-
gation in medical insurance cases although the medical insurance pay-
18. See, e.g., Smith v. Idaho Hosp. Serv., Inc., 89 Idaho 499, 406 P.2d 696 (1965) ;
Barmeier v. Oregon Physicians' Serv., 194 Ore. 659, 243 P.2d 1053 (1952). In both
cases the policy contained a clause providing that the benefits were not applicable in
the event of injury caused by the wrongful act of another except to the extent that the
injured subscriber should make all reasonable efforts to recover from the tort-feasor
and be unable to do so. In spite of the fact that the injured subscriber recovered only
enough for medical expenses without receiving additional general damages, the medical
service was not held liable. See also Moeller v. Associated Hosp. Serv., 304 N.Y. 73,
106 N.E.2d 16 (1952) (clause denying coverage when subscriber received hospital
care under workmen's compensation upheld).
19. See cases cited notes 17 & 18 supra.
20. Associated Hosp. Serv., Inc. v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d
170, 147 N.W.2d 225, 227 (1967).
21. Hospital Serv. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105, 110 (R.I. 1967).
A reduction in cost is significant when viewed in conjunction with the expected 140%
increase in health cost by 1975. See TIMZ, March 15, 1968, at 71. Other policy
reasons may also be involved. See Contractors, Pacific Naval Air Bases v. Pillsbury,
105 F. Supp. 772 (N.D. Cal. 1952), in which the court gave effect to employee's
hospital association subrogation agreement against employee's former employer when
employee had been injured on his former job and was provided medical care by the
association because of the philosophy of the Compensation Act which makes "... the
cost of occupational diseases a business . . ." expense. Id. at 774.
22. This is understandable because in medical insurance subrogation, a novel legal
relationship has outgrown traditional concepts. Life insurance presented unrelated
but similar problems of grappling with developed rules. See Gordon v. Portland Trust
Bank, 201 Ore. 648, 271 P.2d 653 (1954).
. 23. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moses, 287 U.S. 530, 542 (1933); Employers'
Liability Assur. Corp. v. Daley, 183 Misc. 975, 51 N.Y.S.2d 567 (Sup. Ct. 1944), aff'd,
297 N.Y. 745, 77 N.E.2d 515 (1948).
24. Kimball & Davis, The Extension of Insurance Subrogation, 60 MIcH. L. Rev.
841, 854-55 (1962).
25. 3 J. APPLMAN, INsuaRANc LAW & PRACTnCZ § 1675, at 495 (1941).
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ments clearly involved the indemnification of a specific loss.2" The
better reasoned view would be that when a medical insurer pays on
the basis of an insured's actual expenses rather than according to a
fixed scale, the insured is being made whole." Therefore, if no other
factors are present, subrogation should be permitted.
An additional factor which precludes some courts from allowing
subrogation under medical insurance policies is the common law rule
of non-assignability of personal injury actions.2 Some courts have
concluded that subrogation in the medical payments area necessarily
involves an assignment of a personal injury claim.29 The right to
subrogation in such cases will depend on whether or not the law of
the particular state permits the assignment of personal injury actions.
In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Lutz,s0 a subrogation agreement between
a medical insurer and insured was attacked as an unlawful assignment
of a personal injury claim. The court permitted medical payments
subrogation, concluding that: ". . . the law of Ohio now appears to
be relatively clear to the effect that all courts will honor an assignment
to a subrogated insurance company of a part of a cause of action arising
from . . . tortious injury."8' It is unclear from the decision whether
or not the insured executed an assignment; the court apparently as-
sumed that the subrogation agreement had that effect. 2 Because per-
sonal injury claims were assignable under Ohio law, the assignment-
subrogation was viewed by the court as "not definitely improper" and,
consequently, permissible."3 The Lutz court suggested that the Super-
intendent of Insurance had full authority to review the subrogation
clause and had not found it improper. The court reasoned that if the
parties wished to make such an agreement they might do so, and that
with insurance rates constantly increasing, anything "which might help
26. E.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Chumbley, 394 S.W.2d 418, 423 (Mo. App.
1965) (". . . we think it obvious that medical expense does not stand 'on the same
footing as property damage' . . ."). But see Peller v. Liberty Mutual Fire Ins. Co.,
220 Cal. App. 2d 610, 34 Cal. Rptr. 41, 42 (Dist. App. 1963) (basing its decision
on non-assignability, the court rejected the indemnity concept as a "purely verbal"
distinction).
27. See Dambesel v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 60 Ill. App. 2d 282,
209 N.E.2d 876, 878 (1965): "The contract was not one where a person was to be
paid a certain amount for the loss of an arm and another certain amount for a broken
leg. This contract was to indemnify the appellant for medical expenses resulting from
an accident."28. See Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 354 P.2d 1073 (1960) ; Annot.,
40 A.L.R.2d 500, 502 (1955), where it was stated: "It seems that few legal principles
are as well settled, and as universally agreed upon, as the rule that the common law
does not permit assignments of causes of action to recover for personal injuries."
29. See, e.g., Rursch v. Gee, 237 Iowa 1391, 25 N.W.2d 312, 315 (1946): "In the
field of fire insurance the rule governing subrogation is well settled. The payment
of the loss by the insurer operates as an assignment .. " This confusion between
subrogation and assignment is firmly entrenched. Legal subrogation is apparently
viewed as an ". . . assignment by operation of law. . . ." Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 140,
146 (1967). Insurance companies have further muddied the distinction between assign-
ment and subrogation by including assignment requirements in their property insur-
ance subrogation clauses. See Roberts v. Fireman's Ins. Co., 376 Pa. 99, 101 A.2d 747,
748 (1954): "The subrogation clause of the policy required the insured to assign to
the insurance company 'all right of recovery against any party for loss to the extent
that payment therefor is made' by the company."
30. 3 Ohio Misc. 144, 210 N.E.2d 755 (Akron Mun. Ct. 1964).
31. 210 N.E.2d at 759.
32. Id. at 756.
33. Id. at 759.
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settle the disputes" and prevent double recovery by the injured insured
should be permitted. 4 On the other hand, medical payments subroga-
tion was denied in the Missouri case of Travelers Indemnity Co. v.
Chumbley,35 because the court concluded that the status of the insurer
under the subrogation agreement was, ". . . in legal effect, that of an
assignee . . ."' and applied the prevailing Missouri rule that causes of
action for personal injuries cannot be assigned.
At least several other jurisdictions do not distinguish between
subrogation and assignment.3 7 In fact, one court has suggested:
"While subrogation and assignment have certain technical differences,
each operates to transfer from one person to another a cause of action
against a third, and the reasons of policy which make certain causes
of action non-assignable would seem to operate as forcefully against
the transfer of such causes of action by subrogation." 3 Several courts,
however, have recognized a distinction between subrogation and assign-
ment. 9 The Rhode Island court in the principal case pointed out
what are, perhaps, the essential differences:
Assignment involves dangers of champerty and maintenance.
Subrogation does not. Assignment generally involves some con-
34. Id. at 759-60. "It is the opinion of the court that some clarification of this
entire matter by the Legislature would be helpful but that until such clarification takes
place there is no rule against the subrogation on medical payments." Id. at 760.
35. 394 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. App. 1965). In that case a clause in an automobile
insurance policy which subrogated the insurer to the extent of any medical payments
made under the policy was not enforced. See Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 1054 (1968).
36. 394 S.W.2d at 423. Cf., Comment, Automobile Insurance - Assignment,
Subrogation and the Real Party in Interest Statute in Missouri, 26 Mo. L. REv. 62,
63 (1961): "[T]he leading Missouri cases ... have recognized the distinction between
assignment and subrogation." See also Kisling v. MFA Mut. Ins. Co., 399 S.W.2d 245
(Mo. App. 1966). Judge Stone wrote the opinions in both Chumbley and Kisling
and in the latter held that when insured was injured in a three car accident with an
insured motorist and an uninsured motorist the insured could not recover from the
insurer for bodily injury under an uninsured motorist clause when the insured, without
the consent of insurer, settled with the insured motorist. As Judge Stone suggested in
Kisling, "In the absence of inhibition by statute or public policy, the parties to an
insurance policy are free to make their own contract and to include therein such
limitations and restrictions upon the insurer's liability as the contracting parties are
willing to accept and adopt." 399 S.W.2d at 252-53.
37. See, e.g., Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lea, 2 Ariz. App. 538, 410 P.2d 495
(1966); Peller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App.. 2d 610, 34 Cal. Rptr. 41,
42 (1963) (the legislature specifically made personal injury actions non-assignable;
therefore, ". . . any change in the rule must be by legislative action") ; Wrightsman
v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 113 Ga. App. 306, 147 S.E.2d 860 (1966)
(subrogation agreement under automobile medical expense coverage amounts to an
invalid attempt at assignment) ; Packham v. German Fire Ins. Co., 91 Md. 515, 524,
46 A. 1066, 1067 (1900) (subrogation ". . . is . . . an equitable assignment .. ",
quoting MAY, INSURANCE § 454). See also Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 500 (1955), which
discusses the basis of the common law rule of non-assignability.
38. Fifield Manor v. Finston, 54 Cal. 2d 632, 354 P.2d 1073, 1078 (1960).
39. See, e.g., Grace v. United States, 76 F. Supp. 174 (D. Md. 1948) (property
insurance - under the facts of the case, subrogation arose equitably by operation of
law, whereas assignment is voluntary); DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193
So. 2d 224, 227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966), aff'd per curiamn, 202 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1967)
("the concept of subrogation is distinct from that of a mere assignment") ; Damhesel
v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 60 Ill. App. 2d 279, 209 N.E.2d 876, 878
(1965) (medical insurance), quoting Remsen v. Midway Liquors, Inc., 30 Ill. App. 2d
132, 143, 174 N.E.2d 7, 12 (1961):
Subrogation presupposes an actual payment and satisfaction of the debt or claim
to which the party is subrogated although the remedy is kept alive in equity for
the benefit of the one who made the payment under circumstances entitling him
to contribution or indemnity while assignment necessarily contemplates the con-
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sideration moving from the assignee to the assignor. In subroga-
tion the consideration . . . moves in the opposite direction. It
goes from the subrogor to the subrogee. An assignment is made
after a loss to a volunteer who was under no obligation to the
assignor. [The subrogee has already assumed a liability which
matures] . . . into a cause of action against it whenever the
loss occurs .... 40
Because of the failure of some courts to distinguish between sub-
rogation and assignment, 41 insurance companies in several jurisdictions
use the device of the loan receipt or trust agreement as a means of
securing indemnity. These agreements provide either that the payment
by the insurer to the insured is a loan to be repaid only out of the
proceeds of any judgment against the tort-feasor or that upon pay-
ment by the insurer, the insured will hold the proceeds of any judg-
ment in trust for the insurer.42 These agreements create no rights
against the tort-feasor,4' but merely act as an "... equitable lien by
subrogation against any recovery . . ." by the insured.44 The courts
which permit such devices view them as assignments of the proceeds
of the action rather than as assignments of the action itself.4 ' The
insured thus remains the proper party plaintiff.46
Although the issue has not yet been litigated with respect to
medical insurance or medical service plans, the availability of subro-
tinued existence of the debt or claim assigned. Subrogation operates only to secure
contribution and indemnity, whereas an assignment transfers the whole claim.
See also RESTATEMENT Olt RZSTITUTION § 162, comment h, at 661 (1937): ". . . a
person [who] discharges an obligation may be entitled to subrogation even though
the obligation was such that it was not assignable."
40. Hospital Serv. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105, 109 (R.I. 1967).
Cf. RzSTATEmtNT Olt CONTRACTS § 547 (1932): "An assignment of a claim against
a third person . . . is illegal and ineffective if the claim is for . . . damages for" an
injury the gist of which is to the person rather than to property, unless the claim
has been reduced to judgment. . ."
41. Insurers, by requesting assignments from their insureds under medical pay-
ments subrogation clauses, have undoubtedly also confused the distinction. See, e.g.,
Peller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 220 Cal. App. 2d 610, 34 Cal. Rptr. 41, 42 (1963)(insurer refused to pay unless insured ". . . assigned . . . his right to recovery to the
extent of said payments"). See also note 29 supra.
42. See, e.g., Bernardini v. Home & Auto. Ins. Co., 64 Ill. App. 2d 465, 212 N.E.2d
499 (1965) (insured could not recover from insurer after settling with tort-feasor and
defeating subrogation lien in favor of insurer in case involving medical payments);
Remsen v. Midway Liquors, Inc., 30 Ill App. 2d 132, 174 N.E.2d 7 (1961) (a trust
agreement is a valid means of securing indemnity and is not an assignment) ; Penn-
sylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 94 So. 2d 92 (La. 1957) (when insured recovers
from tort-feasor an amount in excess of the loss, he holds as trustee for insurer) ;
Houston Transit Co. v. Goldston, 217 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (a loan
receipt is valid because it helps adjust insurance losses promptly, may keep insurance
rates lower, and is not against the public interest). See also Neighbours v. Harleys-
ville Mut. Cas. CO., 169 F. Supp. 368, 372 (D. Md. 1959) ("Loan receipt arrange-
ments are customary in Maryland, and the practice has recently been approved by the
Fourth Circuit"). See Boynton, The Myth of the "Loan Receipt" Revisited Under
Rule 17(a), 18 S.C.L. Rv. 624 (1966).
43. If insured settles with tort-feasor in contravention of the agreement in the
policy he will not be able to recover on the policy. Bernardini v. Home & Auto. Ins.
Co., 64 Ill. App. 2d 465, 212 N.E.2d 499 (1965).
44. Miller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 48 Misc. 2d 102, 264 N.Y.S.2d 319, 323
(1965). See Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 1054, 1063-66 (1968).
45. Miller v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 48 Misc. 2d 102, 264 N.Y.S.2d 319 (1965).
46. Katz v. Hotel Murida, Inc., 194 Misc. 741, 90 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1949).
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gation in these areas would present a potential problem of splitting
a cause of action.47 The problem arises from the widely accepted pro-
cedural rule that "[f]or a single indivisible tort but one suit can be
brought."4" A strict application of this rule would permit only one
suit to be brought when, as a result of a single tort, an insured suffers
general damages as well as medical expenses.49 Consequently, where
the rule is applied, a subrogated insurer must join in a suit initiated
against the tort-feasor by the insured or be barred from asserting his
rights. At least one jurisdiction has held that while one individual
cannot bring separate actions for a single tort, a subrogor and subrogee
47. Another somewhat related problem is the real party in interest rule. Real
party in interest statutes require that an action be commenced in the name of the
person with the beneficial interest in the subject matter of the action. Although the
wording of these statutes is virtually uniform, they have not been uniformly inter-
preted by the courts. See generally Kessner, Federal Court Interpretations of the
Real Party in Interest Rule in Cases of Subrogation, 39 NEB. L. Riv. 452 (1960) ;
Note, Subrogation: Proper Party Plaintiff in Action Against Tort-Feasor, 7 S.C.L.Q.
463 (1955); Note, Subrogation Claims in Insurance and the Real Party in Interest
Statute, 16 MONT. L. Rv. 101 (1955); 11 OKLA. L. Rv. 83 (1958); Annot., 13
A.L.R.3d 140 (1967); Annot., 13 A.L.R.3d 229 (1967). The real party in interest
rule does not, however, substantively affect the rights of an insurer-subrogee because,
if the insured does not prosecute the action, the insurer may then become the real
party in interest and, if the insurer or insured alone is pursuing the defendant and
the defendant does not object to the absence of one of the parties, objection will
probably be considered to be waived. For example, under the Federal Rules both
insurer and insured are "proper" and "necessary" parties but neither is "indispensable."
United States v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co, 338 U.S. 366 (1949); United States v.
South Carolina State Highway Dep't, 171 F2d 893 (4th Cir. 1948). See also
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Falkingham, 20 F.R.D. 141 (D. Minn. 1957). The rule has
probably its greatest effect in cases in which an insurer wishes to conceal its interest
from the jury and is not allowed to do so.
In Maryland it appears that even under the real party in interest rule, MD.
R.P. 203, because of the subrogation-assignment confusion of both the bench and
the bar and because of time honored practice, insurers continue to bring suit in the
name of the insured. In cases of subrogation sans assignment, the subrogee might
have to be joined as a co-plaintiff in Maryland or he might not be required to join
at all. See 1 SYKss & TABoR, MD. L. ENcY., Procedural Forms § 147, at 81 (1964) ;
Neighbours v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 169 F. Supp. 368, 372 (D. Md. 1959):
Under the Federal Rules it is better practice to make the insurance carrier an
additional party plaintiff, and not to enter the case to its use.... However, the
practice in the Maryland state courts is to enter the case to the use of the insur-
ance carrier, and counsel who practice on both sides of Calvert Street generally
follow that practice in this court. Either method of complying with the rule
is sufficient.
In cases involving trust agreements or loan receipts, the insured probably remains the
real party in interest. See note 46 supra. The real party in interest question has not
been a significant problem in medical insurance cases, but as medical insurance subro-
gation is more frequently litigated, the real party in interest question will probably
be raised. Cases concerning partial payment by insurers for property damage should
provide relevant sources for courts considering the problem.
48. Packham v. German Fire Ins. Co., 91 Md. 515, 526, 46 A. 1066, 1068 (1900).
Maryland has reached what must be the ultimate result of the rule against splitting
a cause of action. In Vane v. C. Hoffberger Co., 196 Md. 450, 77 A.2d 152 (1950),
the defendant, while servicing an oil burner, caused smoke to damage Mr. & Mrs.
Vane's building. The Vanes carried separate insurance policies on their food and
on their building. After assignments were executed to both insurers following their
separate payments of the loss, the food insurer brought suit against defendant in
Peoples Court and was awarded a judgment of $75.00. Before trial in the Peoples
Court, the building insurer, unaware of the pending Peoples Court suit, brought suit
in Baltimore City Court seeking to recover its payment of $598.65. The Court of
Appeals held that there was only one cause of action and that the prior judgment
in the Peoples Court barred the subsequent suit.
49. Cf. Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 1455 (1952).
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can bring individual suits to enforce their separate rights." Further-
more, because the doctrine which prohibits the splitting of a cause of
action is designed to protect the tort-feasor, the tort-feasor can waive
the application of the doctrine by consenting to the split.5 ' Thus, when
the defendant tort-feasor settles with the insured after notice of the
insured's rights of subrogation, he may be considered to have acquiesced
in the splitting of the cause of action.52
A concept which has been invoked by some courts to deny legal
subrogation in certain cases is the rule that the right of subrogation
is not available to one who is primarily liable.53 Thus, in the medical
payments area, the result of the application of this rule is that subro-
gation is not available when the insurer has paid the insured because
required to do so by an unqualified contractual duty.54 Where no
express provision is made for subrogation, the medical service plan
or insurance policy, on its face, renders the insurer absolutely liable to
provide medical payments or services under the terms of the policy.
Under the primary liability rule, legal subrogation would be denied in
such cases. The primary liability theory appears to be only an artificial
expression of the unwillingness of the courts to extend the rights of
the insurer beyond the express terms of the policy. It is difficult to
understand, for example, why the theory applies to medical insurers, to
whom legal subrogation is denied, but not to property insurers, to
whom legal subrogation is available. In short, the primary liability
theory is not an adequate conceptual justification for the denial of
subrogation to medical insurers and should be discarded.
In addition to the technical problem of subrogation in medical
insurance and medical service plans, a corollary question of public
policy is involved. Whether subrogation is permitted in medical pay-
ments cases will necessarily affect the scope of the collateral source or
double recovery rule. This rule provides that, if defendant is liable,
50. Hoosier Cas. Co. v. Davis, 172 Ohio St. 5, 173 N.E.2d 349 (1961). It may
be desirable to have only one cause of action, but the insurer-assignee-subrogee should
be entitled to bring his own cause of action. However, if the tort-feasor so desires,
joinder can be required on motion.
51. See Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Klomparens, 273 Mich. 493, 263 N.W. 724 (1935).
52. Hospital Service Corp. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105, 112 (R.I.
1967). See Cleaveland v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 225 Md. 47, 169 A.2d 446(1961) ; Potomac Ins. Co. v. MacNaughton, 77 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ; Nation-
wide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Canada Dry Bottling Co., 268 N.C. 503, 151 S.E.2d 14 (1966).
53. Machined Parts Corp. v. Scheider, 289 Mich. 567, 286 N.W. 831, 834 (1939) ;
Merchants' Bank & Trust Co. v. Bushnell, 142 Tenn. 275, 218 S.W. 709, 710 (1920):
"The doctrine of subrogation arises only in favor of one who pays the debt of an-
other, and not in favor of one who pays the debt in performance of his own covenants.
This right never follows a primary liability." Accord, Hazel v. Bondy, 173 Ill. 302,
50 N.E. 671 (1898); Brown v. Sheldon State Bank, 139 Iowa 83, 117 N.W. 289
(1908); St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Excello Feed Milling Co., 215 S.W. 755 (Mo. App.
1919) ; Luikart v. Buck, 131 Neb. 866, 270 N.W. 495 (1936).
54. Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 135 Colo. 205, 338 P.2d 702, 714
(1959). The court in that case refused to grant legal subrogation to a hospital associa-
tion which had supplied medical service as required by an employee hospital plan. The
court concluded: "[Wle are unable to perceive that the equities demand expansion of
the subrogation principle .... [T]he Association was legally and primarily obligated to
furnish these services . . . in exchange for the payments which . . . had [been] made."
See also Southland Life Ins. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 366 S.W.2d 245, 249(Tex. Civ. App. 1963) ("Southland paid . . . merely what its policy required it to
pay") ; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. McCarty, 176 Neb. 718, 127 N.W.2d
284 (1964).
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the extent or amount of his liability will not be reduced by payment
to plaintiff from sources other than defendant. 5 The essential pur-
pose of the rule is to prevent the wrongdoer from escaping the con-
sequences of his tortious act and, at the same time, to award to a
prudent plaintiff the benefit of his foresight.5" Because of the collateral
source rule, plaintiffs have been allowed to recover from tort-feasors
the cost of medical services even if they received the services free of
charge57 or recovered the cost from their own insurers." If subroga-
tion is permitted in medical payments insurance, many plaintiffs would
no longer receive double recovery. Dissatisfaction with the double
recovery allowed under the collateral source rule is, perhaps, a major
but generally unarticulated reason why subrogation agreements have
uniformly been upheld in cases involving medical service plans.
For practical purposes, the distinction between medical service
plans and medical insurance is minor. The chief difference is that
medical insurance is provided by profit making concerns whereas medi-
cal service plans, as a rule, are administered by non-profit organizations.
This is the prime reason for the statutory distinction between them;
from the insured's point of view, however, there is no practical differ-
ence. The policy reasons for and against subrogation are equally
applicable to both types of medical coverage. The basic policy justifica-
tion for denying subrogation was articulated in Travelers Indemnity
Co. v. Chumbley.59 In that case, the court felt that if subrogation
55. The Propeller Monticello v. Mollison, 58 U.S. 152 (1854); Rayfield v.
Lawrence, 253 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1958); Harding v. Town of Townshend, 43 Vt.
536 (1871).
56. If subrogation is allowed, while the tort-feasor still must pay damages for
the whole injury, the plaintiff does not receive the benefit of his foresight. See
Ghiardi, The Collateral Source Rule: Multiple Recovery in Personal Injury Actions,
1967 INs. L.J. 457; West, The Collateral Source Rule Sans Subrogation: A Plaintiff's
Windfall, 16 OKLA. L. Rzv. 395 (1963); Comment, Unreason in the Law of Damages:
The Collateral Source Rule, 77 HARV. L. RZv. 741 (1964); Note, The Collateral
Source Rule in the American Law of Damages, 46 MINN. L. Rzv. 669 (1962).
The law review articles are critical of the rule. Courts with perhaps some justifi-
cation have disregarded this criticism. A person who is injured can never really
recoup the full amount of his damages because injury necessarily involves many
intangible factors. Therefore, it seems unreasonable to mitigate damages for which
the tort-feasor is liable simply because plaintiff has usually paid in the form of
premiums or by other means for his collateral benefits. Additionally, the abolition
of the collateral source rule would result in additional problems of proof and additional
splitting of hairs. See McWeeney v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 282 F.2d 34 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 870 (1960) ; Grayson v. Williams, 256 F.2d 61 (10th Cir.
1958) ; Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F.2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1954) ; Roth v. Chatlos, 97 Conn.
282, 116 A. 332 (1922).
57. Rayfield v. Lawrence, 253 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1958) ; Plank v. Summers, 203
Md. 552, 102 A.2d 262 (1954), cited with approval in Rayfield v. Lawrence, supra
at 214.
58. Publix Cab Co. v. Colorado Nat'l Bank, 135 Colo. 205, 338 P.2d 702, 715(1959) : "A ruling in favor of subrogation in this case would undermine the principle
that one who carries health and hospital insurance nevertheless has a right to recover
these amounts from the wrongdoer."
Three out of five potential plaintiffs are covered by their own medical insur-
ance; three out of four by their own surgical insurance; and four out of five by their
own hospital insurance. Ghiardi, The Collateral Source Rule: Multiple Recovery
in Personal Injury Actions, 1967 INs. L.J. 457, 458-59. One-third of Maryland's
population is covered by Blue Cross. Baltimore County Hosp., Inc. v. Maryland Hosp.
Serv., Inc., 234 Md. 427, 200 A.2d 39 (1964).
59. 394 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. App. 1965) ; accord, Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lea,
2 Ariz. App. 538, 410 P.2d 495, 499 (1966). See Annot., 19 A.L.R.3d 1054 (1968).
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were permitted, the courts would be faced with the ". . . unwelcome
specter of multiple subrogation claims by an automobile insurer and
others making payments to the same individual... [which] inevitably
would lead to conflicts and disputes between subrogation claimants,
would complicate and make more difficult the negotiation of voluntary
settlements with third-party tort-feasors, and would encourage and
promote suits and interpleaders, all running counter to the policy of
the law."' 60  This factor militates equally against the recognition of
either legal or conventional subrogation in the medical protection area.
On the other hand, because, under the consumer choice basis of the
insurance industry, an individual can obtain multiple coverage to pro-
tect him against the occurrence of a single contingency,61 the possibility
of a windfall to that individual upon the occurrence of that contingency
is considerable. The incidence of excessive recovery in such a situation
would be greatly reduced by subrogation.
Even if conventional subrogation is allowed in medical insurance
and medical service plans, the existence of a settlement between the
insured and the tort-feasor presents additional questions of policy and
justice. In the instant case, a subrogation clause in a Blue Cross policy
was given effect against a tort-feasor and his insurer who, with knowl-
edge of Blue Cross' subrogation claim, settled with and obtained a
release from the injured subscriber. 62  If this rule were not applied,
the tort-feasor who is aware of the insurer's subrogation rights would
be able to bar the insurer's recovery by deliberately splitting the cause
of action by obtaining a release from the insured. 8 Such a settlement
would constitute a fraud upon the rights of the insurer and, thus, can-
not be a defense in the insurer's action to enforce his subrogation
rights.64 Some courts solve the problem of splitting the cause of action
by ruling that a tort-feasor consents to a separation of the cause of
action by settling with the insured with knowledge of the insurer's
subrogation rights.6 When the tort-feasor does not have notice of
60. 394 S.W.2d at 425.
61. See, e.g., Anderson v. Group Hosp., Inc., 203 A.2d 421 (D.C. Mun. App.
1964) (individual held three medical insurance policies and a surgical insurance policy
and entered a hospital for a hernia operation).
62. 227 A.2d at 112. This rule rests on the presumption that once a tort-feasor
knows of the insurer's subrogation rights or claim, settlement with the insured will
not defeat the right of the insurer because it is an attempt to defeat the subrogation.
Under ordinary circumstances, Blue Cross could not have instituted an action in its
own name against the third party tort-feasor because of the Rhode Island real party
in interest rule, for although there is an exception to that rule which permits a
subrogee-insurer who has paid all or part of a loss, to institute suit in the name of
the insured, Blue Cross is not considered to be an insurer. Therefore, absent the fact
that notice had been given and a presumption of fraud had arisen, Blue Cross could
not avail itself of this exception. Id. at 111. See also Associated Hosp. Serv. v.
Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 33 Wis. 2d 170, 147 N.W.2d 225 (1967), which
permitted Blue Cross to recover payments it had made to its subscriber from third
party tort-feasor's insurer who had settled with subscriber after notice.
63. Cf. Western Maryland Ry. v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 163 Md.
97, 161 A. 5 (1932), which held that subrogation is authorized by the workmen's
compensation statute; therefore, settlement by injured workman cannot be made with
tort-feasor "without the acquiescence of" employer's carrier because the effect of such
a settlement would be an attempt to split the cause of action. By analogy the same
reasoning would apply in cases where tort-feasor has notice of contractual subrogation.
64. See Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. James, 236 S.C. 431, 114 S.E.2d 832 (1960).
65. Hospital Serv. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105, 112 (R.I. 1967)
see Wolverine Ins. Co. v. Klomparens, 273 Mich. 493, 263 N.W. 724 (1935).
[VOL. XXVIII
1968] HOSPITAL SERVICE CORP. V. PENNA. INS. Co.
the subrogation claim, the reasons against allowing a settlement with
the insured to bar the subrogation claim are less persuasive. As a
result, the tort-feasor who settles in good faith is not liable to an
insurer-subrogee."6
In Davenport v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 7
a medical insurer was allowed to recover medical payments it had made
to its insured in a suit against a third party tort-feasor who had settled
with the insured. The dissent argued persuasively that the insurer
clearly had an action at law on the contract against its insured and
should be required to ". . . seek relief at law first ... before consider-
ing equitable remedies.""8 Permitting insurers to seek relief in suits
against tort-feasors who have settled not only permits double recovery
by the insured but imposes double liability on the tort-feasor. On the
surface it might seem that a tort-feasor who settles with insured in
disregard of insurer's known subrogation rights should be liable to
insurer. This ignores, however, the problem of the avaricious insured
who receives payment from a tort-feasor who fears the danger of a
large jury verdict if he does not settle. One court dimly glimpsed this
problem but nevertheless concluded that the insurer ". .. should be
reimbursed by the party whose negligence caused . . ." the damage.6"
In the principal case, the Rhode Island court indicated that,
depending on the facts, the "insurer" could collect either from the
"insured" or from the tort-feasor.7' Because subrogation is founded
on equitable principles, it would seem more consistent in terms of
balancing the equities to require insurer to first attempt collection
from insured before attempting to recover from the tort-feasor. This
would prevent unjust enrichment to the insured on the one hand and
the imposition of excessive liability on the tort-feasor on the other.7 '
As a practical matter, nonetheless, the tort-feasor should usually be
able to protect himself from double liability by making any check in
settlement payable to the order of both insurer and insured when he
has notice of insurer's interest. Usually it would seem to be more
66. See, e.g., Sharp v. Bannon, 258 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1953). See also Robins
Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927) (Holmes, J.): "[Als a
general rule, at least, a tort to the person or property of one man does not make the
tort-feasor liable to another merely because the injured person was under a contract
with that other, unknown to the doer of the wrong."
67. 81 Nev. 361, 404 P.2d 10 (1965).
68. 404 P.2d at 14. Judge Collins suggested that the insured by settling with tort-
feasor ". . . did exactly what they promised and contracted not to do . . . thereby
precipitating this litigation. . . . [The] court . . . should [not] open its doors to
the ... [insurer] under these circumstances. It ... [encourages] contracting parties
to breach their agreement, and in fact reward[s] them for an apparent breach ..
69. Balm v. Shalev, 125 A.2d 678, 680 (D.C. Mun. App. 1956).
70. Hospital Serv. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105, 112 (R.I. 1967).
See also note 62 supra and accompanying text.
71. See Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 23 F. Supp. 1008 (D. Md.
1938): Subrogation ". . . is . . . a thoroughly well established equitable right not
to be denied except in a sound judicial discretion based on some definite adequate
reason therefor." Id. at 1011. See also Ragan v. Kelly, 180 Md. 324, 335, 24 A.2d
289, 295 (1942) ("Subrogation always will be granted when an equitable result will
be obtained"); Maryland Trust Co. v. Poffenberger, 156 Md. 200, 207, 144 A. 249,
251 (1929) ("... to entitle one to subrogation his equity should be strong and his
case clear . .").
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equitable to require insurer to seek recovery at law from the insured, 2
but in those situations involving gross bad faith the tort-feasor should
probably be held liable.
The current trend in cases considering subrogation in medical
service plans and insurance policies is apparently to permit conven-
tional subrogation where medical payments have been made.73 One
cause of this trend may be that the courts, encouraged by the fact that
statutory subrogation is becoming increasingly widespread, are taking
a new look at personal injury subrogation. Virtually every workmen's
compensation statute, for example, provides that an employer's carrier
is subrogated to the rights of the employee against third party tort-
feasors. 4 Furthermore, the Federal Medical Care Recovery Act of
1962 has nullified the holding of United States v. Standard Oil Co.,"5
in which the government was denied the right to recover from a tort-
feasor the cost of medical care rendered to a soldier because of an
injury caused by the negligence of that tort-feasor. Under the 1962
Act, the government can now recover medical care costs from negli-
gent third parties."6
Although it might appear that a clear line has been drawn by
the courts, with subrogation clauses being uniformly given effect in
medical service contracts and generally being disallowed in medical
insurance contracts, such a conclusion cannot be stated as a definite
proposition. California is apparently the only state having decisions
dealing with both types of contracts; under the California decisions
subrogation was granted to a hospital association but was denied to
72. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1966), aff'd Per curiam, 202 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1967) ; Baltimore Transit Co.
v. Harroll, 217 Md. 169, 175, 141 A.2d 912, 915 (1958): "[Tlhe insurer who pays...
benefits [under accident and health insurance policies] is not an indemnitor entitled
to subrogation, unless a statute or contract provision expressly makes him one."
(emphasis added); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Grimes, 153 N.W.2d 152 (Minn.
1967) (insurer could recover medical payments from insured under subrogation
clause) ; Smith v. Motor Club of America Ins. Co., 54 N.J. Super. 37, 148 A.2d 37
(Ch. Div. 1959), aff'd, 56 N.J. Super. 203, 152 A.2d 369 (App. Div. 1959), petition
for cert. denied, 30 N.J. 563, 154 A.2d 451 (1959) (insurer has no obligation under
medical payments subrogation provision to pay insured when insured, by settling with
tort-feasor, has destroyed insurer's subrogation rights) ; Application of Maak, 30
Misc. 2d 610, 222 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (insurer which paid comprehensive
medical benefits was indemnity insurer and hence entitled to subrogation as per con-
tract against tort-feasor). But cf. Forsthove v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
416 S.W.2d 208 (Mo. App. 1967) (medical insurance subrogation clause is invalid).
74. Lasky, Expanded Scope of Recovery in Industrial Third Party Litigation,
41 CALIF. S.B.J. 383 (1966) ; Lupton, Subrogation: Witt v. Jackson - Interpretation,
41 CALIF. S.B.J. 690 (1966); Note, Workmen's Compensation Subrogation Suits:
Allocation of Counsel Fees, 28 U. PITT. L. Rxv. 503 (1967). See MD. ANN. CODE
art. 101, § 58 (1964). See also L. ALrgwT, FLORIDA WORKMEN'S COMPtNSATION LAW
§§ 28: 1-28:6 (1966). But cf. Crab Orchard Improvement Co. v. Chesapeake & 0.
Ry. Co., 115 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 702 (1941) (no subroga-
tion provision in West Virginia workmen's compensation statute, so subrogation
not allowed).
75. 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
76. See Bernzweig, Public Law 87-693: An Analysis and Interpretation of the
Federal Medical Care Recovery Act, 64 COLUM. L. Rzv. 1257 (1964); Gotting,
Recovery of Medical Expenses and the Medical Care Recovery Act, 20 JAG J. 75
(1965-66).
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medical insurers.7" Litigation in both areas is too scant to permit an
inference that the other jurisdictions which have allowed subrogation
in medical service plans would not allow conventional subrogation in
the medical insurance area or a parallel inference that jurisdictions
which have denied medical insurance subrogation would allow con-
ventional subrogation under medical service plans. The point really is
that such a distinction should not be made; the crucial question should
be whether subrogation should be allowed in the general area of
medical payments.
The answer to this question is not simple, for there are public policy
reasons militating both for and against the extension of insurance sub-
rogation in medical payments. The possibility of lower insurance
rates78 and fewer windfalls to plaintiffs on the one side are, perhaps,
balanced by the possibility of multiple subrogation claims and addi-
tional litigation on the other. Because the problem of multiple claims
is the result of the existence of duplicating policies, an obvious solu-
tion would be to restrict the issuance of duplicating policies either by
statute or by a system of self-regulation on the part of insurance
companies and medical service organizations. In any event, medical
insurance subrogation clauses should be given effect at law on a con-
tract theory at least against the insured. In jurisdictions where the
courts do not distinguish between assignment and subrogation and
deny subrogation as an invalid assignment of a cause of action for
personal injuries, subrogation devices such as trust agreements or
loan receipts should be upheld. There is no substantive difference
between medical insurance and medical care plans such as Blue Cross,
and the courts, therefore, should permit conventional subrogation in
both. If the courts were willing to accept the fact that medical pay-
ments are really indemnifications and to distinguish the concept that
subrogation is not available in cases of primary liability, even legal
subrogation might be allowed. However, it does not appear unreason-
able to require insurers who desire subrogation to include a subroga-
tion clause in their policy. 9
Perhaps the major significance of the instant case is its recog-
nition of the distinction between assignment and subrogation. The
recognition of this distinction removes the barrier to the granting of
subrogation in medical service plans and insurance policies which had
77. Subrogation has been allowed in medical insurance policies in Florida, Illinois,
Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey (apparently), New York (apparently), and Ohio.
Medical insurance subrogation may be available in Maryland as well. Subrogation has
been allowed in medical service plans in Michigan, Rhode Island, Wisconsin, and
indirectly, in Idaho and Oregon. Subrogation has not been permitted in medical
insurance policies in Arizona, Georgia, Missouri, Nebraska, and perhaps, Texas.
Subrogation has been denied to hospital associations in Michigan and Colorado. See
cases cited herein.
78. Hospital Serv. Corp. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 227 A.2d 105, 110 (R.I. 1967).
But see DeCespedes v. Prudence Mut. Cas. Co., 193 So. 2d 224, 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1966), aff'd per curiam, 202 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1967): "[A]nticipated recoveries
under subrogation rights are generally not reflected in the computation of premium
rates .... This, however, is a legislative or administrative problem rather than one
that bears on the inherent validity of such a clause."
79. Cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. McCarty, 176 Neb. 718, 127 N.W.2d
284, 286 (1964): "If the insurer wanted a subrogation clause, it knew how to
require one."
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been posed by the rule against assigning personal injury claims and
opens the way to a resolution of the subrogation issue based on prac-
tical considerations of public policy. The limitation upon the effect of
the collateral source rule achieved by medical payments subrogation
is in the final analysis a desirable result. The purpose of medical
service plans and medical insurance should be protection against loss,
not a hopeful gamble on double recovery.8" Although problems of
public policy remain, the Rhode Island decision serves as a useful guide
in the yet largely uncharted area of medical payments subrogation.
80. The implicit irony in excessive and unjustified recovery from insurers was
recognized even at the very beginnings of the modern insurance industry. As W.S.
Gilbert in The "Bab" Ballads remarked:
Down went the owners - greedy men whom hope of gain allured:
Oh, dry the starting tear, for they were heavily insured.
